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Abstract 
 
     This paper compares Egypt’s most essential macroeconomic indicators with respect to 
its sisters in the COMESA region. Based on this descriptive analysis, the paper supports 
mutual coordination between fiscal and monetary policies as a way to enhance the 
effectiveness of both policies. It suggests the utilization of rule-based fiscal policies rather 
than discretionary ones to attain social welfare for the whole region. Finally, it 
recommends the establishment of a supranational coordinating body for fiscal policies 
within a time frame of 3 to 5 years. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination, Fiscal  
                   Policy, Comparative Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy  
JEL Classifications: E61, E62, E63. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________ 
*The opinions expressed in this study are those of the author and do not represent any 
organization of affiliation. 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction   
    
      Effective policy coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities is the best practice 
for maintaining social and economic welfares on the country and regional perspectives. 
Nevertheless, the conflict of interests between the two bodies leads to non-coordinated 
policies and objectives (e.g. Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Woodford, 1995 & 2001; Wren-
Lewis, 2000; Mishkin, 2002; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003; Sims, 2004; Allsopp and Vines 
2005; Gnocchi, 2007) which hinder any economic progress and development.  
      Additionally, the relationship between fiscal and monetary policies is dynamic and 
changing over time both at the national and global levels (Yörükoğlu and Kılınç, 2012). This 
will imply the necessity of a frequent assessment of the concurrent mode of interaction 
between the two policies. 
     On the regional setting, the most important requirements for a successful integration are 
well-built commitment to the convergence criteria, disciplined fiscal policies that are 
consistent with the monetary policies (Edwards and Lawrence, 2012), efficient allocation of 
responsibilities to monetary and fiscal authorities, fair mechanisms to settle disputes, and 
equitable distribution of the gains as well as costs of integration among the member 
countries. (Maruping, 2005; The ECA, 2004). Moreover, the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies is an essential prerequisite for the success of integration since the benefits 
in terms of trade, optimal policies formulation and increases in living standards offset the 
loss of policy independence for an individual member state (Masalila, 2010). 
      The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA, hereafter) indicates a 
wide disparity of population and incomes where Egypt accounts for the largest shares of 
population and income (Carmignani, 2005).1 The COMESA’s integrating framework targets 
achieving a solid coordinating agenda among its nationals. It also adapts the experience of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU, hereafter) in harmonizing the macroeconomic 
indicators of its countries (Masson and Pattillo, 2004; Zhang, 2012).  
       The COMESA aims at ensuring and supporting macroeconomic stability in the region 
through the observance of macroeconomic convergence criteria and the implementation of 
appropriate structural reforms (Masalila, 2010). 
                                                             
1
  The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) comprises 20 countries.  The 
members are Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, South Sudan, 
Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
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     This paper summarizes the relative position of Egypt to the COMESA’s countries 
through using macroeconomic indicators (e.g. inflation rates, real GDP per capita, fiscal 
policy, and trade shares).  The descriptive analysis indicates the constraints imposed by the 
existing practices of discretionary fiscal policies on the sustainability of macroeconomic 
policies in the district. These various policies bound the effectiveness of the COMESA’s 
Treaty in unifying the actual performance of major macroeconomic indicators. In order to 
overcome the problem of fiscal dominance in most of the member states, the COMESA’s 
integrating framework has to enforce additional fiscal adjustment procedures and obligatory 
fiscal convergence criteria.  
       The current conditions that are confronting the COMESA has led to the emergence of 
the arguments of fiscal versus monetary policy dominance and fiscal policy rules versus 
discretion for further exploration in the economic literature. 
        This paper is structured as follows; section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 highlights 
the main outcomes of the descriptive analysis. Section 4 concludes and provides some 
policy recommendations. 
 
 
2.   Literature Review 
    
 
          Several streams in the economic literature have investigated the interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policies.
2
 One strand has focused on the coordination between the two 
policies in the context of the EMU and the inflation targeting paradigm (Beddie, 1999). 
Another trend has investigated the optimal monetary and fiscal policies within a union (e.g. 
Buti et al., 2001; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003; Gnocchi, 2008; Galí and Monacelli, 2008; 
Orjasniemi, 2014).  Closely related research streams have concentrated on the disagreement 
concerning rules-based versus discretionary fiscal policies (e.g. Wyplosz, 2011) and the 
debate about monetary and fiscal dominance regimes (e.g. Sargent and Wallace, 1981; 
Woodford, 1995 & 2001).  
 
 
                                                             
2
 For more details on the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies, one can refer to the 
following studies: (Smith 1957; Sargent and Wallace, 1981; Blinder, 1982; Buti et al., 2001; 
Hemming et al., 2002; Dixit and Lambertini, 2003; Galí and Monacelli, 2008; Wyplosz, 2011; 
Pappa, 2012; Šehović, 2013). 
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       (Corden, 1972; Masson and Pattillo, 2004) have argued that monetary integration will 
draw attention to the importance of the appropriate design of a monetary-fiscal policy mix.
 3
 
In this case, the role of fiscal policy in attaining an internal balance and that of monetary 
policy to realize an external balance will have to arise.  
     (Galí and Monacelli, 2008) have suggested an optimal monetary-fiscal policy mix within 
a monetary union through the stabilization of inflation by a sole central bank and the 
stabilization of fiscal policies through country-specific discretionary fiscal policy rules. This 
mix has a maximization outcome on the average welfare of households in the union. On the 
contrary, (Gnocchi, 2007) has argued that coordinated discretionary national fiscal policies 
will not be an optimal tool for maximizing the welfare of the union. The conflict of interests 
between the common central bank and several governments about the pros and cons of 
monetary policy actions will lead to the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy in buffering against 
asymmetric shocks that are more likely to hit the union. 
4
 Accordingly, the discretionary or 
rule-based fiscal policy argument has become a cornerstone in the literature on monetary 
unions given the diverging behavior of fiscal policies practiced by member states and its 
impact on the union’s prospect (Buti, et al., 2001; Gnocchi, 2007).  
      The experience of the Euro Area suggests that a country with a history of 
macroeconomic instability may not adhere to fiscal discipline commitment and will fail in 
building-up a reputation about fiscal restraint. This country will inevitably harm the others’ 
growth and employment objectives. Consequently, the negative spillovers from the fiscal 
irresponsible behavior of such country will raise concerns regarding the union’s stability 
(Harvey et al., 2001; C. R. Vieira and I. V. Vieira, 2013).5  
         In order to resolve the discretionary or rule-based fiscal policy argument, the valuable 
role of institutions in enhancing fiscal discipline has been demonstrated by many authors 
(e.g. Wren-Lewis, 1996 & 2000; Harvey et al., 2001; Perotti, 2002; Masson and Pattillo, 
2003; Wyplosz, 2011).  
 
                                                             
3
 An optimum currency area (OCA) usually represents the ultimate goal of any monetary 
integration. Nevertheless, other monetary integrations may aim at attaining prices and exchange rates 
stability. On the other hand, few monetary integrating frameworks may consider enhancing the trade 
links among member countries as a major priority. 
4
According to the OCA theory pioneered by (Mundell, 1961) and has been extended by (McKinnon, 
1963) the members of a monetary union will be vulnerable to asymmetric shocks (Orjasniemi, 2014). 
5 The cases of Greece, Italy and Spain are typical examples for these concerns. 
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       Well-established Institutions within a union will provide an external agency of restraints 
over national economic policies and may result in merging fiscal policy indicators. The 
institutional design in a monetary union will confine the negative impacts of several 
governments on the monetary policy of a sole central bank. In the absence of institutions the 
central bank’s ability towards maintaining price stability will be limited.
6
 Therefore, 
maintaining fiscal sustainability 7 is a precondition for a successful monetary union since 
unsustainable fiscal behavior will eventually undermine the ability of the central bank to 
maintain monetary stability, in the long-run (Oshikoya and Tarawalie, 2010). 
      Nevertheless, governments are normally reluctant to surrender powers to a supranational 
fiscal authority in a union. Only long-term relationships between members that create 
incentives based on reputations and institutions can encourage sustainable policy 
coordination (Harvey et al., 2001).  
     The fiscal dominance versus monetary dominance argument has practical implications on 
a feasible monetary union through affecting the institutions that are established for the 
purpose of maintaining macroeconomic objectives and are aiming at fostering fiscal 
sustainability (Bbinyeluaku and Viegi, 2009). 
      Fiscal dominance can be defined as a situation in which both high public debt ratios and 
heightened sovereign risk are weakening the domestic banking system (Turner, 2011). It can 
also be defined as a phenomenon when a perceived increase in sovereign risk and 
considerable uncertainty about future interest rates last for many years (Blommestein and 
Turner, 2012; Blommestein and Hubig, 2012). According to (Woodford, 2001), it is a policy 
regime, often associated with special fiscal pressures of war finance, in which other goals of 
the central bank are subordinated to the goal of assisting in financing the government’s 
budget. Fiscal dominance is induced in less-developed countries by several reasons (e.g. the 
dependence of the central bank on the Treasury with the adherence of the former to the 
latter’s seignorage targets, the existence of less-sophisticated financial markets with the 
agent’s inability to substitute among financial assets). 
 
                                                             
6
 There is a fully independent European Central Bank (ECB) in the EMU where a legal prohibition 
to finance government deficits also exists in the Maastricht Treaty (Cangiano and Mottu, 1998; 
Henry et al., 2004). 
7
 Fiscal policy persistence or sustainability can be defined as a measure of the degree of dependence 
of current fiscal policy behavior on its own past developments (Afonso, et al., 2008). 
Additionally, the fiscal policy stance will be regarded as unsustainable if the government is not able 
to service its debt (the IMF, 2011).  
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      Under fiscal dominance, the fiscal authority sets on its own the budget, announces the 
current and future deficits regardless of the monetary authority’s inflation targets, and 
determines the amount of revenues that must be raised from the sales of bonds and 
seignorage (Sargent and Wallace, 1981). This situation limits the central bank’s 
independence and distorts the credibility of monetary policy. 
       The negative implications of fiscal or monetary policy dominance on maintaining the 
overriding goals of the macroeconomic policy have been resolved by a massive 
investigation in the theoretical literature on the coordination between monetary and fiscal 
policies.  Objectives such as economic stability and growth may be attained by appropriate 
coordination of the two policies and the choice of the right mix between them (Smith, 1957). 
The lack of coordination will result in inferior overall economic performance.  
      Some countries have tried to adopt the inflation targeting monetary policy regime to 
overcome the problem of fiscal dominance. However, governments can still pursue 
irresponsible fiscal policy within such regime. Furthermore, the exchange-rate flexibility 
required by this regime may cause financial instability. Therefore, a high degree of 
coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities is demanded (Mishkin, 2002).  
      Consequently, the institutional design and regular revision of the convergence criteria 
are key factors towards improved macroeconomic policy coordination.  For that reason, the 
proposals for maintaining fiscal discipline through institutions have incorporated; (i) the 
upgrading of the transparency of budgetary practices; (ii) the introduction of national and 
supranational fiscal policy rules; (iii) the delegating of fiscal policy to an independent 
agency or council; and (iv) the combining of rules and independent fiscal councils in 
designing fiscal policies (Cangiano and Mottu, 1998; Capet, 2004; Leith and Wren-Lewis 
2005; Wyplosz, 2011).  
       For instance, the Maastricht Treaty has enforced fiscal policy rules in terms of annual 
budget deficit that does not exceed 3% of GDP and public debt that does not exceed 60% of 
GDP (Orbán and Szapáry, 2004). In addition, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) monitors 
the fiscal conduct of the EMU’s members. It can be considered as an external anchor of 
fiscal policies (Annett, 2006) and as a supranational fiscal policy rule for fiscal discipline in 
the Euro area (Wyplosz, 2011). The SGP does not substitute the domestic institutional 
arrangements for fiscal policy to attain medium-term fiscal sustainability (Lane, 2006).  
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      The effectiveness of the SGP has been subject to extensive assessment in the literature 
after the global finical crisis and the problematic economic conditions of Greece and other 
neighborhoods (e.g. Seng and Biesenbender, 2012). This criticism has also expanded to 
reach the assessment of the SGP as a tool for smoothing output fluctuations (Cangiano and 
Mottu, 1998; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; Buti et al., 2001).  
       On the individual country context for institutional design, (Wren-Lewis,1996) have 
suggested an independent advisory body to maintain sustainable national government 
finances parallel to the central bank along with a discretionary fiscal policy. (Wren-Lewis, 
2000) has supported the idea of automatic stabilizers 
8
 rather than discretionary fiscal 
policies as ways to impose institutional and political constrains on the national government. 
Additionally, he has pointed out to the need for giving a limited fiscal-regulatory role to the 
central bank.
9
   
   Furthermore, a similar debate has emerged both on the country and regional settings 
concerning the appropriate fiscal policy rule given the wide range of economic and fiscal 
outcomes from each rule.   
     In this regard, (Schaechter et al., 2012, p. 8) have classified these rules into five 
categories (i.e. the balanced budget, structural budget balance, revenues, expenditures, and 
debt rules). To be more specifically; (Cordes et al., 2015) have suggested the application of 
expenditure rules as tools for government’s spending control, counter-cyclical fiscal policy, 
enhanced fiscal sustainability, and improved fiscal discipline. 
      Accordingly, the selection of the rule and its expected outcome will differ based on the 
country’s economic situation, its degree of openness, and previous fiscal policy stance. A 
country may apply more than one rule (e.g. Kenya adopts revenues and debt rules since 
1997) or choose one rule and revert to another one based on the developments in the fiscal 
and debt variables. This gives an indication of the essentiality of finding possible rules to 
conquer a disciplined fiscal policy (The International Monetary Fund, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
8
Automatic stabilizers are the budget items suitable for mitigating demand shocks. These are the 
best tools of the fiscal policy when the public sector is developed, the tax system is highly 
progressive, and unemployment benefits are generous (Capet, 2004). 
9
 (Wren-Lewis, 1996 & 2000) focused on the relation between the Bank of England (BoE) and the 
government in the United Kingdom. 
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     The discretionary or rule-based fiscal policy dispute is relevant to the effectiveness of 
fiscal policy (Hemming et al., 2002; Arestis, 2011). The theoretical and empirical literature 
has been skeptic about this issue. Numerous studies in the literature have assessed the main 
components and characteristics of fiscal policy in advanced economies. Most of these 
studies has analyzed the responsiveness of fiscal policy to output in order to explore the 
impact of automatic stabilizers (Fatás and Mihov, 2003; Afonso et al., 2008).10 These 
studies have put greater emphasis on fiscal policy as a key tool for macroeconomic 
stabilization (e.g. Wren-Lewis 2000; Krugman 2005; Leith and Wren-Lewis 2005).11 
      Moreover, the effectiveness of fiscal policy is often assessed in the context of 
discretionary fiscal policy. For instance, many contributions have analyzed the impact of 
fiscal discretion on the macroeconomic environment (e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995; Fatás 
and Mihov, 2003) 12 and the relationship between the size of the government and income 
volatility (Fatás and Mihov, 2001). In this respect, the aggressive use of discretionary fiscal 
policy will possibly amplify the business cycle fluctuations and harm the economic growth 
(Fatás and Mihov, 2003; Capet, 2004).13 In addition, the type of fiscal adjustment 
procedures plays a vital role in determining the fiscal policy effects (de Arcangelis and 
Lamartine, 2003).
14
  
                                                             
10
On the theoretical basis, fiscal policy is consisted of three components (Fatás and Mihov, 2003); 
(i) automatic stabilizers; (ii) discretionary fiscal policy that reacts to the state of the economy; and 
(iii) discretionary policy that is implemented for reasons other than current macroeconomic 
conditions (i.e. changes in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal policy stance).The main characteristics of 
fiscal policy are its responsiveness, persistence or sustainability, and discretionary behavior (Afonso 
et al., 2008).  
11 
(Ilzetzki et al., 2009) have shown that the magnitude of the fiscal policy multipliers depends on 
the following characteristics of the economy; (i) closed versus open, (ii) predetermined versus 
flexible exchange rate regimes, (iii) high versus low debt. It also relies on the fiscal policy variable 
being considered (e.g. government’s consumption versus government’s investment). In general, 
(Capet, 2004) has demonstrated that the higher the degree of the economy’s openness is, the lower 
the fiscal multipliers and stabilizers are.  
12
According to (Alesina and Perotti, 1995), the fiscal discretion represents the unintended change in 
the budgetary position of the government as response to exogenous factors other than the business 
cycle. The Blanchard (1990)’s indicator of a discretion fiscal policy is defined as the structural 
primary fiscal deficit as a fraction of income (Blanchard, 1990; Van Aarle and Garretsen, 2003).   
13
 The results are the outcome of using annual data for ninety-one countries over the period from 
1960 to 2000. 
14
 For example, the fiscal adjustments in OECD countries that rely mainly on spending cuts in 
transfers and the government’s wage bill have a better chance of success and are expansionary. On 
the contrary, fiscal adjustments that depend on tax increases and cuts in public investment do not last 
and are contractionary. These are main issues concerning the prosperity of the economy (Alesina and 
Perotti, 1995 &1997). 
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     Another determinant of the usefulness of fiscal policies is the type of monetary policy 
regime. 
15
 The recent trends in practical monetary policy towards inflation targeting regime 
with its requirements (an independent monetary authority which targets price stability as an 
overriding policy objective, fiscal discipline as an attainable and sustainable practice, and 
zero financing from the central bank to the government’s budget as an enforced principle) 
have led to a diminishing stabilizing role of fiscal policy in the economy (Allsopp and Vines 
2005). 
      According to (Mishkin, 2002) inflation targeting may help in constraining the fiscal 
policy to the extent that the government is involved in setting the inflation targets jointly 
with the central bank. This will entail the importance of monetary and fiscal policies 
coordination.  
      On the other hand, there is a new view in the macroeconomic policy debate that fiscal 
policy is ineffective (Arestis, 2011). In such a case, a monetary policy oriented towards 
macroeconomic control will be inevitable. This also implies that the macroeconomic 
impacts of fiscal policy do not matter as long as policy sustainability is guaranteed (Allsopp 
and Vines 2005).  
      Furthermore, trivial influences and weak magnitudes of fiscal policy on the economy 
have been supported by the empirical evidence for OECD economies (e.g. Perotti, 2002; de 
Arcangelis and Lamartine, 2003) as well as for the EMU (e.g. Van Aarle and Garretsen, 
2003).  
         As a consequence, several aspects cast doubts on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in 
developing counties as well as low-income countries (e.g. the repeated supply shocks that 
dampen the demand-side effects of fiscal policy, no access to international capital markets, 
poor tax administration, inefficient expenditure management, governance problems, volatile 
revenue bases, long lags of fiscal policy impact, the need to subsidize loss-making public 
enterprises, and greater deficit bias). Relevant key factors for emerging market economies 
are the borrowing constraints and limited access to finance that the economic agents are 
bounded by, the limited commitment of the government to the tax policy, and the attitude of 
the government towards consumptions (Aguiar et al., 2005; Arestis, 2011). 
       According to (Hemming et al. 2002), these are factors in favor of using fiscal policy 
rules as tools to improve the effectiveness of such policy.  
                                                             
15
 The Japan’s experience of low-interest rates environment which reaches to zero-interest supports 
the argument of an effective fiscal policy that operates under an ineffective monetary policy 
(Krugman, 2005). 
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      A final word regarding the discretionary vis-à-vis fiscal rules debate has not been 
reached by the literature, yet. This is because of the different outcomes from various types of 
shocks that are more likely to hit the union.
 
Additionally, the impact of fiscal policy is 
relevant to the monetary unification considerations. For instance, external shocks are more 
likely to hit members within a monetary union. Fiscal policy cannot usually respond as 
quickly as monetary policy to these shocks. However, a change in the direction of fiscal 
policy through fiscal tightening can have a sizeable effect on external variables (Yörükoğlu 
and Kılınç, 2012). 
     Furthermore, a strong committed central bank to price stability within the union limits the 
scope of the national fiscal authorities in mitigating the effects of idiosyncratic shocks. For 
this reason, the coordination between discretion fiscal policies will be a must. 
16
  
     Moreover, the cost of a monetary union is the country’s inability to use monetary policy 
to react to country-specific shocks. Fiscal discipline and other integration requirements 
increase the social and economic costs of adjusting to specific shocks and add to the 
difficulties in acquiring and maintaining competitiveness (C. R. Vieira and I. V. Vieira, 
2013).  However, these costs can be reduced via labor mobility between member states 
and/or prices and wages flexibility (Corden, 1972; Buigut and Valev, 2005; Edwards and 
Lawrence, 2012). Moreover, the synchronization of the member countries’ economic 
business cycles will contribute in absorbing the negative influence of external shocks 
(Njoroge et al., 2011)).17  
      Concerning the COMESA, (Buigut and Valev, 2005; Debrun et al., 2010; Njoroge et al., 
2011) have supported the broad conclusion by many studies that the type of real shocks that 
are hitting the region are highly asymmetric.
18
 This can be attributed to differences in the 
mixes of commodity production. This result has been confirmed by empirical assessment 
(Buigut and Valev, 2005).  
                                                             
16
 For more details refer to (Buti, et al., 2001, pp. 803-804). 
17
This point is essential for the final steps of monetary integration because of its close relation with 
other important issues (e.g. the debate on the optimality of monetary integration, the endogeneity of 
OCA criteria, intensity of bilateral trade and correlations of business cycles, monetary integration as 
disciplinary effect, and the specialization hypothesis). For further details one can refer to (e.g. 
Mundell, 1961; Frankel and Rose, 1997; Broz, 2005; C. R. Vieira and I. V. Vieira, 2013; Njoroge et 
al., 2011). 
18
(Krugman,1993) have pointed out to the impact of high trade integration, specialization and factor 
mobility on business cycles asymmetry in the EMU. On the contrary, high trade integration is 
regarded by (Frankel and Rose, 1997) as a source for income symmetry in the EMU. 
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       In addition, (Njoroge et al., 2011) have analyzed the nature, extent, and consequences of 
internal as well as external shocks in the COMESA during the period from 1990 to 2009. 
The authors’ results have reflected negative effects of a monetary union on the participating 
countries by revealing them to large internal and external shocks. In this regard, (Enoch and 
Krueger, 2010) have verified that asymmetric shocks within a monetary union will force 
countries to rely on fiscal policy instruments to shield the economy against them. On the 
other hand, strong trade links may contribute to greater similarity of economic fluctuations 
and to better outcomes from monetary integration.  
     There is no doubt that reducing trade barriers in the COMESA will reduce major sources 
of government’s revenues (taxes on international trade). This negative effect will cast doubts 
on the expected long-term benefits from regional integration (Alemayehu, and Haile, 2008). 
In order to overcome these obstacles, it will be essential to carry out deep analysis of the 
characteristics of national fiscal policies and shocks within each member state in the region. 
Furthermore, fiscal policy coordination will be a must. 
   In conclusion, there is no doubt that the existence of clear policy targets and rules will be 
proper means to obtain macroeconomic policy coordination.  
 
3. The Performance of Egypt Relative to the 
COMESA’s Member States 
 
 
        This section of the paper summarizes the relative position of Egypt to its sisters in the 
COMESA through using macroeconomic indicators (e.g. inflation rates, real GDP per 
capita, fiscal policy, and trade shares).
19
  The COMESA’s history has begun in December 
1994 to replace the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) which has existed by the early of 1981. 
For the purpose of policy coordination, a Monetary Harmonization Program (MHP, 
hereafter) has been prepared in 1990. The MHP and the convergence criteria of the 
COMESA’s Treaty have been subject to several revisions by the COMESA’s Secretariat. 
These revisions have indicated some progress towards the policy and institutional targets. 
This progress is ascribed to the individual country’s political concerns or the international 
organizations’ conditionality, not to the country’s obligation towards the COMESA’s 
integrating requirements (Harvey et al., 2001; Masson and Pattillo, 2004). Breaches to the 
convergence criteria have been reported in the COMESA’s reports (e.g. The COMESA’s 
Official Website) and other regional reports (e.g. Zhang, 2012; Mbekeani, 2013). 
                                                             
19
 The authors’ calculations based on data collected from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Economic Outlook Database as in April 2015 and the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor as in April 2015. 
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        The convergence criteria have been subject to subsequent revisions according to the 
actual performance of the COMESA’s member states and the quality of the reporting 
mechanisms of economic indicators to the COMESA’s secretariat. Table (1) illustrates the 
revised convergence criteria. 
 
Table (1): Revised Monetary Cooperation Program of the COMESA 
Stage 1 (Year 2005-2010) 
Primary Criteria 
(i) Overall budget deficit/GDP ratio (excluding grants) of not more than 5%; 
(ii) Annual average inflation rate not exceeding 5%; 
(iii) Minimize the central bank financing of the budget towards 0% target; and 
(iv) External reserves of equal to or more than 4 months of imports of goods and non-factor services. 
Secondary Criteria 
(i) Achievement and maintenance of stable real exchange rates; 
(ii) Achievement and maintenance of market based positive real interest rates; 
(iii) Achievement of sustainable real growth rate of real GDP of not less than 7.0%; 
(iv) Sustained pursuit of debt reduction initiative on domestic and foreign debt. i.e. reduction of total debt as a ratio 
of GDP to a sustainable level; 
(v) Total domestic revenue to GDP ratio of not less than 20%; 
(vi) Reduction of current account deficit (excluding grants) as a % of GDP to sustainable level; 
(vii) Achievement and maintenance of domestic investment rate of at least 20%; 
(viii) Implementation of the 25 Core Principles of Bank Supervision and Regulation based on agreed Action Plan for 
Harmonization of Bank Supervision for the COMESA region; and 
(ix) Adherence to the Core Principles for Systematically Important Payments Systems, by modernizing the payment 
and settlements system. 
Stage Two (2011-2015) 
Primary Criteria 
(i) Overall budget deficit/GDP ratio (excluding grants) not exceeding 4%; 
(ii) Annual average inflation rate of not more than 3%; 
(iii) Elimination of the central bank financing of the budget deficit; and 
(iv) External reserves of equal to or more than 5 months of imports of goods and services. 
Secondary Criteria 
Same as in Stage 1 
Stage Three (2016-2018) 
Primary Criteria 
(i) Overall budget deficit/GDP ratio (excluding grants) not exceeding 3% 
(ii) Annual average inflation rate not exceeding 3%; 
(iii) Elimination of central bank financing of the budget deficit; and 
(iv) External reserves of equal to or more than 6 months of imports goods and services. 
Secondary Criteria 
Same as in Stage 1 
            Source: (Bhatia et al., 2011, p. 51).  
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3.1. Inflation Rates 
 
      The overall COMESA’s year on year inflation rate reflects considerable and persistent 
breaches from the COMESA’s monetary policy convergence criteria. The rate has presented 
an average of almost 9.5% in June 2015 compared to 13.0% in June 2014 and approximately 
8.6% in June 2013. Figure (1)  
     The COMESA’s high annual averages of inflation rates are ascribed to the increasing 
inflationary pressures in its three major countries which have had the highest weights in 
HCPI-COMESA index.
20
 This will imply a challenge facing the region in coordinating 
monetary as well as fiscal policies.  
       The annual averages of inflation rates for the periods from December 2011 to December 
2012 and from October 2013 to December 2014 exceed 10.0%. However, the years 2013 
and 2015 have witnessed annual inflation rates that are less than 10.0%. The least annual 
inflation rate of 7.3% has been recorded in July 2015.  In the same context, table (2) shows 
that only two countries have been obliged to the monetary policy criterion for the second 
stage of monetary integration (2011-2015).
21
 The annual average inflation rate for 
Zimbabwe is 2.3% during the period (2010-2014). Seychelles is the second best country 
with 2.6%.  
     For that reason, appropriate coordination on the monetary policy side is essential for the 
COMESA region. In this respect, the burden will lie on Egypt, Sudan, Malawi, and Ethiopia 
because of the increasing inflation rates in these countries. Some member countries do not 
report inflation rates to the COMESA’s secretariat which complicate the assessment 
procedures of the inflationary practices in the district. Therefore, finding a way for building-
p an efficient reporting arrangement of inflation rates in the COMESA will be a must. 
                                                             
20
 This rate is based on the Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI-COMESA). This index is 
constructed for the purpose of comparing the inflation rates of the COMESA’s members. The latest 
weights for the major three countries in the region are 58.71 for Egypt, 8.93 for Sudan, and 7.47 for 
Ethiopia).   
21
 The Monetary Harmonization Program (MHP) has determined the least optimistic criterion of an 
annual average inflation rate of less than 10% (Harvey et al., 2001). The monetary policy criterion 
for the COMESA region is very optimistic as it sets ceilings for annual average inflation rates at 3% 
and 5% during the three subsequent economic and monetary convergence stages (Bhatia et al., 2011, 
p. 51). 
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Figure (1): Developments in the COMESA’s Annual  
Inflation Rates (%) (December 2011- July 2015) 
        
 
                            Source: The Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI-COMESA), Monthly News Released data on July 2015, Issue No. 52, pp. 10-11. 
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Table (2): The Monetary Policy Convergence in the COMESA 
Country 
Average 
inflation 
(1995-
1999) 
Average 
inflation 
(2000-
2004) 
Average 
inflation 
(2005-
2009) 
Average 
inflation 
(2010-
2014) 
 
Comments on the averages of the period 
(2010-2014)* 
Burundi 18.56 9.93 11.87 9.32 The country does not meet the criterion 
Comoros 1.87 4.65 4.10 17.39 Does not meet the criterion with considerable inflationary pressures 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
334.37 
 
189.88 
 
23.10 
 
8.59 
 The countries do not meet the criterion 
Djibouti 2.54 1.90 5.04 3.62 
Egypt 6.28 3.32 10.39 9.69 
Eritrea 8.77 19.85 17.96 12.56 Do not meet the criterion with considerable 
inflationary pressures Ethiopia 3.25 4.11 19.06 16.19 
Kenya 6.96 6.46 8.76 8.06 
Do not meet the criterion 
 
Libya 4.44 -4.48 4.64 5.97 
Madagascar 13.39 11.12 9.72 7.03 
Malawi 40.91 17.62 10.88 17.68 Does not meet the criterion with considerable inflationary pressures 
Mauritius 6.62 4.93 6.99 3.95 
Do not meet the criterion 
Rwanda 15.56 5.73 10.56 4.00 
Sudan 48.41 6.90 12.11 29.25 
The country does not meet the criterion with 
considerable and distorting inflationary pressures. 
The worst country in the region regarding its 
inflation practices. 
      
Seychelles 
 
1.66 3.94 11.78 2.60 The country meets the criterion with the second best 
inflation practice in the region 
Swaziland 8.01 7.18 7.03 6.19 
Do not meet the criterion 
 
Uganda 6.68 3.89 8.98 8.94 
Zambia 30.73 21.81 12.77 7.73 
Zimbabwe NA 8.34 18.38 2.33 The country meets the criterion with the first best inflation practice in the region 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook (WEO) Database, April 2015. 
* The criterion for the second stage of integration (2011-2015) is an annual average inflation rate of 
no more than 3%. 
NA refers to unavailable data. 
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Figure (2): Year on Year Inflation Rate (%) in the COMESA 
Region and in Individual Member States (in June 2015) 
 
 
 
Source: The Harmonized Consumer Price Index (HCPI-COMESA), Monthly News 
                       Release June 2015, Issue No. 51, p.2. 
                      Data are not available for Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Libya. 
 
        
        Egypt’s annual inflation rate has increased by 10.8% in June 2015 relative to 7.7% in 
June 2014. Additionally, Ethiopia’s rate has increased from 8.0% in June 2014 to reach 
12.2% in June 2015. Sudan’s rate has increased by 42.4% in June 2014 and by 21.9% in 
June 2015. On the contrary, Zimbabwe has recorded a deflation with an annual rate of 2.8% 
in June 2015 and a zero rate of inflation in June 2014 (The HCPI-COMESA Monthly News 
Release). 
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3.2.   Real GDP per Capita 
 
     Real GDP per capita has been utilized by many authors as a proxy for real economic 
convergence among countries (e.g. Harvey et al., 2001; Carmignani, 2005; Alemayehu and 
Haile, 2008). Based on the standard deviation as a measure of income disparities within the 
COMESA region,
22
 table (3) shows symmetry in log GDP per capita between the individual 
member states. Additionally, table (4) indicates symmetry in the growth rates of log GDP 
per capita between members. 
     However, the main contributor to the minor variations in the region’s income has been 
Libya with standard deviations of almost 0.2 for log GDP per capita and 0.1 for the growth 
rate of log GDP per capita.  
     On the other hand, it is essential to find out a proxy measure to assess the convergence of 
the overall COMESA’s income rather than the convergence of each member country. 
Therefore, the sigma convergence criterion is computed as in (Harvey et al., 2001; Monfort, 
2008).
23
 
   For comparability in real per capita income, figure (3) represents a depiction of the 
standard deviation of log real GDP per capita for the COMESA region during the period that 
spans from 1997 to 2014. The year 2011 has witnessed the lowest standard deviation. One 
intuitive explanation to this decline is the role that the political conditions in Egypt, Libya, 
and Sudan have played in diverging the real GDP per capita.
24
 This is due to the large 
shares of these three countries in the real income of the whole region. Year 2014 indicates 
the same conclusion concerning coexisting deviations in this vital indicator.  
 
 
                                                             
22
 The results are subject to the series that is utilized as a proxy for real income, the sample size, and 
the statistic that is used to measure the income disparities. 
23
 The author has calculated the beta convergence criterion through regressing the initial real GDP 
per capita on the growth rate of real GDP per capita via a pooled data for the COMESA region 
during the period 2010-2014. The results have indicated a nonlinear and dynamic association 
between the two variables. This implies that other factors are essential for the analysis of real income 
convergence. For instance, the political instability has led to the difficulty of obtaining a direct and 
linear relationship between initial status of income and the subsequent growth rates of income.  
24
 By the beginning of year 2011, the protests and demonstrations have been started in both Egypt 
and Libya. Additionally, the independence of Southern Sudan has taken place in the same year. 
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Table (3): Developments in Log Real GDP per capita in the COMESA’s 
Member States (2010-2014)* 
  
 
Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis 
 Jarque-
Bera  Prob. 
Burundi 2.93 2.93 2.96 2.90 0.02 0.00 1.74 0.33 0.85 
Comoros 3.17 3.17 3.19 3.16 0.01 0.14 1.63 0.41 0.81 
Djibouti 3.45 3.45 3.48 3.42 0.03 0.09 1.76 0.33 0.85 
Democratic_ 
Rep._of_ 
Congo 2.79 2.79 2.85 2.74 0.04 0.13 1.73 0.35 0.84 
Egypt 4.03 4.03 4.04 4.01 0.01 -0.27 1.84 0.34 0.84 
Eritrea 3.06 3.08 3.08 3.03 0.02 -1.00 2.39 0.91 0.63 
Ethiopia 3.13 3.13 3.20 3.05 0.06 -0.07 1.80 0.31 0.86 
Kenya 3.45 3.45 3.49 3.42 0.03 -0.10 1.81 0.30 0.86 
Libya 4.29 4.32 4.47 4.07 0.16 -0.28 1.81 0.36 0.84 
Madagascar 3.15 3.15 3.16 3.13 0.01 0.11 1.60 0.42 0.81 
Malawi 2.86 2.86 2.89 2.84 0.02 0.32 1.94 0.32 0.85 
Mauritius 4.23 4.23 4.27 4.18 0.03 -0.11 1.77 0.33 0.85 
Rwanda 3.18 3.19 3.23 3.13 0.04 -0.28 1.80 0.37 0.83 
Sudan 3.62 3.62 3.65 3.56 0.03 -0.86 2.62 0.65 0.72 
Swaziland 3.87 3.87 3.89 3.86 0.01 0.28 1.47 0.55 0.76 
Seychelles 4.36 4.37 4.41 4.30 0.04 -0.32 1.73 0.42 0.81 
Uganda 3.28 3.28 3.31 3.26 0.02 -0.43 2.25 0.27 0.87 
Zambia 3.57 3.57 3.61 3.53 0.03 -0.16 1.65 0.40 0.82 
Zimbabwe 3.26 3.28 3.31 3.19 0.05 -0.53 1.86 0.51 0.77 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
*Data are obtained from the Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) per capita GDP series.  The series is used for comparability of developments in real 
per capita income during the period 2010 to 2014. 
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Table (4): Developments in the Growth Rate of Log Real GDP per capita 
in the COMESA’s Member States (2010-2014)*  
  
 
Mean 
 
Median  Maximum  Minimum 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Prob. 
Burundi 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -0.32 1.46 0.58 0.75 
Comoros 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -1.05 2.58 0.96 0.62 
Djibouti 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -0.95 2.76 0.76 0.68 
Democratic_ 
Rep._of_ 
Congo 4.61 4.61 4.62 4.61 0.00 0.24 1.67 0.41 0.81 
Egypt 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 1.21 2.91 1.22 0.54 
Eritrea 4.61 4.61 4.62 4.60 0.01 0.50 1.39 0.75 0.69 
Ethiopia 4.62 4.62 4.62 4.62 0.00 0.67 2.26 0.48 0.79 
Kenya 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 0.63 2.12 0.49 0.78 
Libya 4.59 4.59 4.68 4.51 0.06 0.07 2.33 0.10 0.95 
Madagascar 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.60 0.00 -0.99 2.60 0.85 0.65 
Malawi 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -1.11 2.81 1.03 0.60 
Mauritius 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 0.83 2.29 0.68 0.71 
Rwanda 4.61 4.61 4.62 4.61 0.00 -0.11 1.46 0.51 0.78 
Sudan 4.61 4.61 4.63 4.59 0.01 0.80 2.69 0.55 0.76 
Swaziland 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -0.80 2.56 0.58 0.75 
Seychelles 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 -0.05 1.70 0.36 0.84 
Uganda 4.61 4.61 4.61 4.61 0.00 0.09 1.34 0.58 0.75 
Zambia 4.61 4.61 4.62 4.61 0.00 0.85 2.67 0.62 0.73 
Zimbabwe 4.62 4.62 4.62 4.61 0.00 -0.33 1.32 0.68 0.71 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
*Data are obtained from the Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing power parity 
(PPP) per capita GDP series.  The series is used for comparability of developments in real 
per capita income during the period 2010 to 2014. 
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Figure (3): Standard Deviation of Log Real GDP per capita of 
the COMESA Region (1997-2014) 
 
 
 
    Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
The data available for 19 member countries and are pooled using the E-views software to 
obtain the standard deviation of the series for the COMESA region.  
*Data are obtained from the Gross Domestic Product based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) per capita GDP series. 
 
3.3. Fiscal Policies 
     The COMESA’s fiscal policy indicators have been poorly reported to the regional as well 
as international institutions. This has complicated the possibility of an efficient 
comparability of the actual fiscal performance in the region. Tables (5) through (10) support 
this general conclusion. The tables present main fiscal policy variables that are collected 
from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, April 2015. The averages of these variables have been 
computed for the period (2010-2014). In general, the government’s budget deficit and debt 
percents of GDP have remained high in major countries in the region. Table (5) has shown 
the general government’s overall balance (including grants) as a percent of GDP.  
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        Based on the averages of the period (2010-2014), all countries have recorded deficits 
except the Democratic Republic of Congo with a surplus of 1.9%. Egypt, Kenya, and Libya 
have recorded deficits of 11.0%, 5.2%, and 4.8%, respectively. Table (6) indicates the 
general government’s primary balance as a percent of GDP. The averages for Egypt, Libya, 
and Kenya have been 5.3%, 4.8%, and 3.1%, respectively. Egypt is the country with the 
highest averages as has been reflected in tables (5) & (6). 
     Consequently, the high averages for the period (2010-2014) of inflation rates and the 
government’s overall balance as a percent of GDP indicate the importance of improving 
fiscal consolidation in Egypt. Moreover, the current situation of the Egyptian’s financial 
markets implies the impossibility to enforce an important convergence criterion for the 
COMESA’s integrating framework (i.e. the elimination of the CBE’s financing of the 
budget deficit). On the contrary, Zimbabwe is the best performer in the inflation and fiscal 
policy indicators since it has traced the success of a major country like South Africa.  
       Tables (7) & (8) present the general government’s revenue and expenditure as percents 
of GDP.  Depending on the averages of the period (2010-2014), Libya is the country with 
the highest average of the general government’s revenue of 56.6%. Zimbabwe is the second 
best country with 26.7%. Egypt is ordered the fourth with 23.4%. The country with the 
lowest percent is Madagascar with 11.7%. On the general government’s expenditure side, 
Libya has had the highest average of 61.4%. Egypt is ordered the second with an average of 
34.7%. Zimbabwe is the third best country with 27.6%. The country with the lowest percent 
is Madagascar with 14.2%. 
    Tables (9) & (10) illustrate the general government’s gross and net debts as percents of 
GDP. The worst country regarding the average of the gross debt as a percent of GDP is 
Egypt with 81.6%.
25
 Sudan is the second worst country with 80.6%. Zimbabwe and Kenya 
have recorded 56.0% and 43.8%, respectively. The best performer is the Democratic 
Republic of Congo with an average of 21.7%. The political instability in Libya has led to a 
negative average of net debt as a percent of GDP of 107.3% due to the economic recession. 
On the contrary, Egypt has had the highest positive average of net debt as a percent of GDP 
of 70.5%. Kenya has recorded a positive percent of 39.9%. Ethiopia is the country with the 
lowest positive percent of 20.0%. These fiscal and debt indicators reflect unsustainable 
fiscal policy in Egypt. Conversely, the fiscal indicators for Kenya reflect the benefits from 
the adoption of fiscal policy rules.  
                                                             
25 A ratio of gross debt as a percent of GDP that is less than 60% is considered by international 
institutions as a criterion for debt sustainability.  
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      Kenya follows two fiscal policy rules (i.e. the revenue and debt rules) since 1997. This 
has been indicated in table (11). It is important to find out appropriate mechanisms for 
reporting comparable fiscal policy indicators of the COMESA to international and regional 
organizations. Table (11) indicates conflicting information regarding the adoption of fiscal 
policy rules in the region’s members. Therefore, the formation of a coordinating body of 
fiscal policies in the region may resolve this issue and enhance the economic convergence.  
Table (5): General Government’s Overall Balance (% of GDP) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of 
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
1.9 -0.2 -1.1 1.3 2.5 -0.5 1.8 3.1 2.6 1.6 1.9 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt -9.2 -7.5 –8.0 –6.9 –8.3 –9.8 –10.5 –14.1 –12.2 –11.5 -11.0 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia -3.8 -3.6 -2.9 -0.9 -1.3 -1.6 -1.2 -1.9 -2.6 -2.9 -1.7 
Kenya -2.1 -2.4 -3.4 -4.3 -4.4 -4.1 -5.0 -5.7 -6.8 -7.6 -5.2 
Libya 31.8 28.6 27.5 -5.3 11.6 -15.9 27.8 -4.0 -43.5 -68.2 -4.8 
Madagascar -0.5 -2.7 -2.0 -2.5 -0.9 -2.4 -2.6 -4.0 -2.4 -4.0 -2.5 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda 0.2 -1.7 0.9 0.3 0.4 -1.8 -1.6 -2.6 -3.6 -2.0 -1.8 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan -1.4 -3.5 0.6 -5.1 0.3 0.2 -3.3 -2.3 -1.0 -1.5 -1.2 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda -0.7 -1.0 -2.5 -2.1 -5.8 -2.6 -3.0 -4.1 -3.9 -2.7 -3.9 
Zambia 16.9 -1.0 -0.7 -2.1 -2.4 -1.8 -3.2 -6.7 -5.6 -5.1 -3.9 
Zimbabwe -2.5 -3.0 -2.0 -2.1 0.7 -1.3 -0.6 -1.9 -1.5 -1.2 -0.9 
Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, April 2015.  The concept of overall 
fiscal balance referred to net lending (+) / borrowing (−) of the general government. In some 
cases, however, the overall balance referred to total revenue and grants minus total expenditure 
and net lending. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data 
source.  
The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
   *The IMF’s projections.  
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Table (6): General Government’s Primary Balance (% of GDP)  
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of  
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
3.1 0.9 -0.1 2.7 3.9 1.3 3.3 4.4 3.6 2.6 3.3 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt -4.2 -3.0 -3.9 -3.7 -3.8 -4.7 -5.1 -6.6 -6.1 -4.4 -5.3 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia -3.0 -2.9 -2.4 -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -1.6 -2.3 -2.5 -1.4 
Kenya -0.5 -0.8 -1.8 -2.7 -2.5 -2.2 -2.9 -3.3 -4.5 -5.4 -3.1 
Libya 31.8 28.6 27.5 -5.3 11.6 -15.9 27.8 -4.0 -43.5 -68.2 -4.8 
Madagascar 2.0 -1.5 -1.2 -1.8 -0.1 -1.5 -1.9 -3.3 -1.5 -2.8 -1.7 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda 1.0 -1.2 1.4 0.6 0.9 -1.4 -1.1 -1.8 -2.8 -1.3 -1.2 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan -0.2 -2.5 1.5 -4.1 1.4 1.4 -2.2 -1.8 -0.3 -0.7 -0.3 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda 0.4 0.1 -1.4 -1.1 -4.9 -1.7 -1.7 -2.7 -2.2 -0.9 -2.6 
Zambia 18.5 0.3 0.7 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8 -1.9 -5.1 -3.4 -2.6 -2.4 
Zimbabwe 0.0 -1.2 0.3 0.4 1.9 -0.2 0.4 -1.0 -0.4 0.1 0.1 
Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor, April 2015.  The concept of overall fiscal 
balance referred to net lending (+) / borrowing (−) of the general government. In some cases, 
however, the overall balance referred to total revenue and grants minus total expenditure and net 
lending. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data source.  
The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
*The IMF’s projections.  
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Table (7): General Government’s Revenue (% of GDP) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of 
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
11.8 10.4 11.5 15.2 20.3 15.7 17.3 15.8 14.3 15.7 16.7 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt 28.6 27.7 28.0 27.7 25.1 22.0 22.1 23.0 25.0 23.4 23.4 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia 18.3 17.0 15.9 16.2 17.2 16.6 15.5 15.9 15.1 16.2 16.1 
Kenya 19.3 19.7 19.4 18.8 19.8 19.5 19.2 19.6 20.5 21.3 19.7 
Libya 63.0 62.3 68.4 52.9 64.9 39.1 72.3 65.7 40.9 27.5 56.6 
Madagascar 21.0 16.0 15.9 11.5 13.2 11.7 10.8 10.9 12.0 12.6 11.7 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda 21.9 21.2 25.2 24.1 26.3 24.6 24.2 25.1 23.8 23.3 24.8 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan 22.4 21.9 24.0 15.5 19.3 18.0 9.9 10.9 11.7 10.8 14.0 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda 14.9 14.6 13.7 12.9 13.5 14.1 13.6 12.7 13.4 14.4 13.5 
Zambia 36.6 18.9 18.8 15.7 15.6 17.5 19.1 18.4 19.1 18.0 17.9 
Zimbabwe 7.3 2.9 2.2 12.0 23.3 26.7 28.0 27.7 27.6 27.9 26.7 
             Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor,  
              April 2015. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data  
            source. 
            The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
           *The IMF’s projections. 
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Table (8): General Government’s Expenditure (% of GDP) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of 
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
9.9 10.6 12.6 13.9 17.9 16.2 15.5 12.7 11.7 14.1 14.8 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt 37.8 35.3 36.0 34.6 33.4 31.8 32.7 37.1 38.6 35.2 34.7 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia 22.1 20.5 18.8 17.1 18.5 18.2 16.6 17.8 17.7 19.1 17.8 
Kenya 21.5 22.1 22.8 23.1 24.2 23.6 24.2 25.3 27.3 28.9 24.9 
Libya 31.2 33.7 40.8 58.2 53.4 55.0 44.5 69.8 84.4 95.6 61.4 
Madagascar 21.4 18.7 17.9 14.1 14.0 14.1 13.4 14.9 14.5 16.6 14.2 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda 21.7 22.9 24.3 23.9 25.9 26.5 25.9 27.6 27.4 25.3 26.7 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan 23.8 25.4 23.5 20.6 19.0 17.8 13.3 13.1 12.7 12.3 15.2 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda 15.6 15.6 16.2 15.0 19.3 16.7 16.6 16.8 17.3 17.1 17.3 
Zambia 19.7 19.9 19.5 17.8 18.1 19.3 22.3 25.1 24.6 23.1 21.9 
Zimbabwe 9.7 5.9 4.3 14.0 22.6 27.9 28.6 29.7 29.0 29.1 27.6 
 Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor,  
      April 2015. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data  
     source. 
     The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
     *The IMF’s projections. 
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Table (9): General Government’s Gross Debt (% of GDP) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of 
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
100.0 83.4 87.0 89.8 27.2 23.0 19.9 18.9 19.7 20.5 21.7 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt 90.3 80.2 70.2 73.0 73.2 76.6 78.9 89.0 90.5 90.5 81.6 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia 38.7 36.6 30.2 24.9 27.4 25.7 20.9 21.6 21.9 21.7 23.5 
Kenya 44.0 38.4 41.5 41.1 44.4 43.0 40.8 42.2 48.6 50.1 43.8 
Libya - - - - - - - - - - - 
Madagascar 37.3 32.8 31.8 33.4 31.9 32.4 33.7 34.0 34.9 35.1 33.4 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda 26.6 26.7 20.9 22.6 22.8 23.7 23.7 29.0 28.0 29.1 25.4 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan 75.0 70.7 68.8 72.1 73.1 70.5 94.7 90.5 74.2 78.5 80.6 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda 31.7 20.0 19.6 18.8 23.6 23.3 24.6 27.4 30.4 35.3 25.9 
Zambia 25.0 21.9 19.2 20.5 18.9 20.6 25.5 28.8 31.1 32.4 25.0 
Zimbabwe 44.7 50.1 68.9 68.3 63.2 51.8 56.7 54.2 54.0 55.2 56.0 
Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor,  
 April 2015. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data source. 
The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
*The IMF’s projections. 
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Table (10): General Government’s Net Debt (% of GDP) 
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Average of 
( 2010-2014) 
Burundi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Comoros - - - - - - - - - - - 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
- - - - - - - - - - - 
Djibouti - - - - - - - - - - - 
Egypt 71.4 64.5 55.6 58.7 60.0 64.5 67.9 78.1 81.9 83.0 70.5 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - - - 
Ethiopia 29.0 28.7 25.4 20.9 23.3 20.4 17.7 18.8 19.6 19.8 20.0 
Kenya 39.9 34.4 37.1 36.9 40.2 39.1 37.1 38.4 44.9 47.4 39.9 
Libya -77.8 -77.6 -70.2 -93.6 -86.9 -170.5 -83.6 -92.9 -102.6 -49.9 -107.3 
Madagascar - - - - - - - - - - - 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - - - 
Rwanda - - - - - - - - - - - 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - 
Sudan - - - - - - - - - - - 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uganda - - - - - - - - - - - 
Zambia 21.6 17.6 16.3 16.5 15.9 16.2 20.0 25.0 29.0 31.9 21.2 
Zimbabwe - - - - - - - - - - - 
Source: Data are collected from the IMF’s Fiscal Monitor,  
 April 2015. The Symbol (-) indicates the non-availability of the data point from the data source. 
The average of (2010-2014) is computed. 
*The IMF’s projections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table (11): Fiscal Rules among the COMESA’s Member Countries  
Type of Fiscal 
Rule* 
Country Year of 
Implementation 
Notes 
 
 
Debt Rule  
 
& 
 
Revenue 
Rule  
 
 
 
 
Kenya 
 
 
 
Since 1997 
- Debt Rule that sets policy goals for debt ratios. 
However, these have proved to be non-binding and 
subject to changes. Currently, the debt-to-GDP ratio 
in net present value (NPV) terms to be below 40 
percent and/or total nominal debt to be below 45 
percent of GDP (as a goal of their medium-term 
debt management strategy).  Moreover, the 
government overdraft from the central bank is 
limited to 5 percent of previous year revenue.                     
- Revenue Rule which aims at maintaining revenue 
at 21-22 percent of GDP.  
Type of Fiscal 
Rule** 
Country Notes 
No Rule Burundi, 
Comoros, 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, 
Libya, Seychelles, 
Sudan, Uganda, 
Committed to improve fiscal performance through the convergence 
criteria, which is determined by the COMESA’s treaty. 
Expenditure 
Rule 
Ethiopia, Kenya 
Madagascar, 
Malawi, 
Mauritius, 
Rwanda, 
Swaziland and 
Zambia 
Expenditure rule in Zambia is specific to salary and wage bill of the civil 
service (currently 8% of GDP) while in Swaziland, the expenditure is 
based on the estimated revenue collection. In the case of Ethiopia, 
Madagascar, Malawi and Zambia, the rule targets a specific expenditure 
to GDP ratio while in Mauritius; a combination of real and nominal 
expenditure ceiling is used. Kenya uses nominal expenditure ceiling as well 
as expenditure to GDP ratio. 
Revenue 
Rule 
 
Ethiopia, Kenya 
Madagascar, 
Malawi, 
Mauritius and 
Rwanda 
 
In Kenya and Madagascar, the rule imposes constraints on the 
developments in the tax-to-GDP ratio. The number of years for which the 
rule imposes the constraint is one year. In most countries, the entire 
government is covered by the fiscal rule while in a few cases the central 
government is covered by the fiscal rule. Formal agreement of parties in 
government defines the fiscal rule. The central budget authority is in 
charge of monitoring compliance with the fiscal rules in most countries. In 
case of non-compliance with the fiscal rules, there are no ex-ante 
enforcement procedures such as presentation of proposal to the legislature 
with corrective measures, nor implementation of corrective measures by 
the government or ministry responsible for the overrun or sanctions. 
Budget 
Balance (Surplus/ 
Deficit) 
Rule 
Ethiopia, Kenya 
Madagascar, 
Malawi, Rwanda, 
Zambia and 
Zimbabwe 
In Zambia, the budget balance rule is limited to the domestic balance. In 
most of these countries, the rule targets a specific budget balance in 
nominal terms. 
 
Debt Rule Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritius, 
Rwanda 
In the case of Mauritius, the debt to GDP ratio has to be on a downward 
trend. Capital expenditure has to be at least equal to net borrowing 
constant expenditure rule. 
 
           *Sources: The International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s Fiscal Rules Dataset (1985-2014), Last updated  
             in April 2015; (Schaechter et al., 2012, p.44). Fiscal rules are defined as longer-lasting constraints                
             on fiscal policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. 
            **Source: (Bhatia et al., 2011, p. 64). 
27 
 
     Figure (4) represents the averages of the general government’s revenue and expenditure 
as percents of GDP for the period (2010-2014).  Libya is the country with the highest 
averages; whereas Madagascar is the country with the lowest averages. In order to evaluate 
the possibility of converging the fiscal policy performance in the COMESA, data available 
for 19 member countries have been pooled using the E-views software to obtain the standard 
deviations of two series (i.e. the general government’s revenue and expenditures) for the 
COMESA region during the period (2010-2014).       
 
Figure (4): Averages of the General Government’s Revenue and 
Expenditures (% of GDP) in Individual Member States of the COMESA 
Region (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, 
World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
 
 
 
   Figure (5) displays large disparities in the COMESA’s general government’s revenues and 
expenditures. This implies variety of the tax systems and tariff schemes within the region. 
The main contributors to these deviations are Libya, Comoros, Swaziland, Sudan, Burundi, 
and Malawi (table 12). Moreover, the differences in the COMESA’s general government’s 
expenditures have started to emerge from 2012 and henceforth. The major contributors to 
these variations are Libya, Malawi Djibouti, Burundi, Swaziland, Zambia, Sudan, and Egypt 
(table 13). 
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Table (12): Descriptive Statistics of the General Government’s Revenue in the 
COMESA’s Member States (2010-2014) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
Burundi 32.2 31.4 37.2 26.7 4.3 0.0 1.5 0.4 0.8 
Comoros 29.6 28.6 43.0 23.5 8.0 1.1 2.7 1.0 0.6 
Djibouti 34.2 34.5 35.6 32.2 1.2 -0.8 2.6 0.6 0.7 
Democratic 
Rep. of 
Congo 16.7 15.8 20.3 14.3 2.3 0.8 2.4 0.6 0.7 
Egypt 23.5 23.0 25.1 22.0 1.5 0.2 1.2 0.7 0.7 
Eritrea 17.6 17.4 18.6 17.2 0.6 1.4 3.1 1.6 0.4 
Ethiopia 16.0 15.9 17.2 15.1 0.8 0.3 1.6 0.5 0.8 
Kenya 19.7 19.6 20.5 19.2 0.5 0.7 2.4 0.5 0.8 
Libya 56.6 64.9 72.3 39.1 15.4 -0.3 1.3 0.7 0.7 
Madagascar 11.7 11.7 13.2 10.8 1.0 0.6 2.0 0.5 0.8 
Malawi 37.1 38.6 40.2 29.8 4.3 -1.1 2.7 1.1 0.6 
Mauritius 21.3 21.4 21.9 20.6 0.5 -0.8 2.6 0.5 0.8 
Rwanda 24.8 24.6 26.3 23.8 1.0 0.7 2.3 0.5 0.8 
Sudan 14.0 11.7 19.3 9.9 4.4 0.4 1.3 0.7 0.7 
Swaziland 31.1 34.9 36.3 23.9 6.4 -0.4 1.2 0.8 0.7 
Seychelles 36.6 35.9 38.8 35.1 1.7 0.4 1.4 0.7 0.7 
Uganda 13.5 13.5 14.1 12.7 0.5 -0.3 2.4 0.1 0.9 
Zambia 18.0 18.4 19.1 15.6 1.4 -0.9 2.3 0.7 0.7 
Zimbabwe 26.7 27.6 28.0 23.3 2.0 -1.3 2.9 1.3 0.5 
Table (13): Descriptive Statistics of the General Government’s Expenditure in the 
COMESA’s Member States (2010-2014) 
 Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-
Bera 
Probability 
Burundi 35.4 35.1 40.8 30.1 4.8 0.1 1.3 0.6 0.7 
Comoros 23.7 23.8 25.3 22.1 1.6 0.0 1.3 0.6 0.7 
Djibouti 38.9 37.2 47.5 35.5 4.9 1.4 3.1 1.6 0.4 
Democratic 
Rep. of 
Congo 14.8 15.5 17.9 11.7 2.5 -0.1 1.5 0.5 0.8 
Egypt 34.7 33.4 38.6 31.8 3.0 0.4 1.4 0.6 0.7 
Eritrea 31.5 30.7 34.6 29.0 2.5 0.3 1.4 0.6 0.7 
Ethiopia 17.8 17.8 18.5 16.6 0.7 -0.8 2.4 0.6 0.7 
Kenya 24.9 24.2 27.3 23.6 1.5 0.9 2.4 0.7 0.7 
Libya 61.4 55.0 84.4 44.5 15.8 0.5 1.9 0.5 0.8 
Madagascar 14.2 14.1 14.9 13.4 0.5 -0.1 2.1 0.2 0.9 
Malawi 41.1 41.2 49.3 35.0 5.4 0.5 2.2 0.4 0.8 
Mauritius 24.4 24.6 25.1 23.3 0.7 -0.6 1.9 0.6 0.8 
Rwanda 26.6 26.5 27.6 25.9 0.8 0.2 1.3 0.6 0.7 
Sudan 15.2 13.3 19.0 12.7 3.0 0.5 1.3 0.8 0.7 
Swaziland 33.3 34.2 38.3 28.5 3.8 0.0 1.9 0.3 0.9 
Seychelles 34.6 34.7 36.1 31.9 1.6 -1.0 2.6 0.8 0.7 
Uganda 17.4 16.8 19.3 16.6 1.1 1.3 3.0 1.4 0.5 
Zambia 21.9 22.3 25.1 18.1 3.1 -0.2 1.4 0.6 0.7 
Zimbabwe 27.6 28.6 29.7 22.6 2.9 -1.3 3.0 1.4 0.5 
Source for tables (12) & (13): The author’s calculations based on data from the International 
Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
29 
 
Figure (5): Standard Deviations of the General Government’s Revenue 
and Expenditures (% of GDP) for the COMESA Region (2010-2014) 
 
 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
Data for 19 member countries are pooled using the E-views to obtain the standard deviation of the 
series for the COMESA region. 
 
 
 
    Figure (6) represents the averages of the general government’s overall and primary 
balances as percents of GDP for the period (2010-2014). Figure (7) displays the averages of 
the general government’s net and gross debts as percents of GDP. Eritrea and Egypt are the 
countries with the highest deficits and debt indicators in the region. These two countries are 
challenged by unsustainable fiscal and debt variables.  
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Figure (6): Averages of the General Government’s Overall and Primary 
Balances (% of GDP) in Individual Member States of the COMESA 
Region (2010-2014)  
 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
 
Figure (7): Averages of the General Government’s Gross and Net Debts 
(% of GDP) in Individual Member States of the COMESA Region 
 (2010-2014) 
 
Source: The author’s calculations based on data from the International Monetary Fund, World Economic 
Outlook Database (WEO), April 2015. 
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3.4. Trade Shares 
 
          The COMESA’s most important achievement in its integrating framework has been 
the formation of a Free Trade Area (FTA) by nine member countries in 2000. This area has 
eliminated tariffs and quotas on goods that conform to the COMESA’s rules of origin 
(Masson and Pattillo, 2004).26 The COMESA has done further steps to integrate trade 
policies and to encourage investments via the abolishment of barriers to the movements of 
goods and services, factors of production, and human capital within the region (Carmignani, 
2005). Moreover, the COMESA’s orientation towards the harmonization of its regional 
agenda with those of its corresponding Regional Economic Communities (RECs) represents 
a complexity in its integrating framework.  
           In October 2008, the COMESA has planned to form a Continental Free Trade Area 
(CFTA) (the UNECA, 2012). The establishment of Tripartite COMESA–EAC–SADC 
Agreement to merge the COMESA, SADC, and EAC regions in a common trade area 
represents an important step to reach a CFTA.
27
  This trade integration will generate 
benefits to the three regions subject to the political dedication by individual states to follow 
the principles of integration (Bhatia et al., 2011; the UNECA, 2012). Nevertheless, the 
overlapping membership in various areas has been considered by (the World Bank, 2000; 
ECA, 2010; Khandelwal, 2004; Buigut and Valev, 2005; Mbekeani, 2013) as a hurdle to 
guarantee efficient integration that bounds the effectiveness of convergence criteria and 
harms the possible gains from free trade.28 This can be ascribed to confusions arising from 
differences in rules of origin, wasteful duplication of efforts, forgone capacities, costly 
negotiating resources, resulting administrative costs, and counter-productive competition 
among countries as well as institutions. 
                                                             
26 The FTA members are Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. 
27 The Tripartite FTA arrangement is signed on 10th of June 2015 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt. This 
trade agreement will build on the FTAs that are already in place in COMESA, EAC, and SADC 
regions. The Tripartite FTA covers 26 countries (i.e. Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe). For more details, one can refer to the 
COMESA’s Official website. 
28 The COMESA comprises 20 countries of which four are also members of the EAC. The SADC 
has 15 member countries of which eight are also members of the COMESA and one is a member of 
the EAC. Given this inter-locking membership and the Tripartite Agreement to merge the three 
RECs, the COMESA is facing key challenges (Bhatia et al., 2011). 
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    The membership conflict in several FTAs is difficult to be resolved because of political 
concerns (Khandelwal, 2004; the ECA, 2010) unless there is political commitment 
(Mbekeani, 2013) by members to adhere to the agreements besides national fiscal policies 
coordination. Additionally, reducing trade barriers in countries where taxes on trade are the 
most significant sources of the general government’s revenue complicates the inter-temporal 
tradeoff between the short-term loss of revenues and the expected long-term benefits from 
regional integration (Alemayehu and Haile, 2008). This highlights the importance of 
continued fiscal policy reforms in addition to viable coordination between monetary and 
fiscal policies in the region.  
     Egypt is close to these concerns since the Egyptian fiscal authority is grabbing efforts to 
create and generate other tax sources given the expected revenue loss from the subsequent 
stages of trade integration within the COMESA and other optimistic tripartite COMESA-
SADC-EAC trade agreement.  
Table (14): Budget Sector Tax Revenues in Egypt  
(1989-2014) 
 
Source: IMF Country Report for Egypt, Report No. 15/33, p. 38. 
 
      Table (14) reflects a decline in taxes on international trade as a percentage of GDP since 
FY 2002/03.  
33 
 
    On the other hand, the COMESA’s international trade shares with its main trading 
partners as well as its intra-trade links play as key factors in determining the effectiveness of 
the monetary integration within the region. Tables (15) & (16) describe the international 
trade between the COMESA’s countries and the EU.  
     In 2014, Libya and Egypt represent over 70.0% of the EU’s exports to the COMESA. In 
the same year, Libya represents the leading trade partner with 43.8% of the EU’s imports 
and Egypt has recorded a share of 30.1%.The EU’s exports to the COMESA have grown by 
an annual average rate of 7.1% during the period (2002-2014). The EU’s imports from the 
COMESA have increased by an annual average rate of 8.6 % during the same period. 
 
Table (15): The EU-28’s Exports of Goods to COMESA’s 
Countries  
 
(EUR million)        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat Statistics-Explained 
-[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics
ined/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_the_Common_Market_for_Eastern_and_Southern_Afriexpla
ca_(COMESA)&oldid=237595]. 
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Table (16): The EU-28’s Imports of Goods from the COMESA’s 
Countries 
(EUR million) 
 
 
Sources :Eurostat Statistics-Explained 
-eurostat/statistics[http://ec.europa.eu/
explained/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_the_Common_Market_for_Eastern_and_Southern_Afri
.ca_(COMESA)&oldid=237595] 
 
    Regarding the intra-COMESA’s trade, table (17) shows that Egypt has registered the 
biggest market share for exports with 23.8% in 2013.  However, this presents a drop from 
the previous year’s share of 27.0%. Kenya is the second with 19.1%. It has been followed by 
Zambia in the ordering. On the imports side, Zambia has maintained its position as the 
county with the biggest market share of almost 26.0% in 2013, up from the previous year’s 
share of 19.0%. Egypt is the 7th in that rank with a share of 6.0% (COMESA, 2014).               
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     The improvement in the intra-COMESA’s trade has to be the priority of the region. In the 
same vein, the tariffs schemes in the major importers countries have to be revised in order to 
enhance trade links. Furthermore, one of the prerequisites for an effective economic and 
monetary integration is high percentage of intra-regional trade. This is not the concurrent 
case with shares less than 50.0%, in the exports and imports sides. This is a significant 
challenge confronting the COMESA. Accordingly, the national fiscal authorities have to 
provide more incentives to enhance intra-trade and coordinate policies. 
Table (17): Intra-COMESA Trade, 2013, Values in US$ Million  
and (% Share) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: COMESA, International Trade Statistics Bulletin No. 13, November 2014, p. 23. 
These are the latest available data from the COMESA’s Official Website. 
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4. Concluding Remarks and Policy 
Recommendations: 
 
· This paper has summarized the relative position of Egypt to the COMESA’s member 
states through using vital fiscal and monetary policy indicators. Built on this 
descriptive analysis, the paper advocates the importance of coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policies in the COMESA to attain optimal macroeconomic 
policies.  
· Increasing trade shares, maintaining price stability, and practicing disciplined fiscal 
policies have to be the overriding objectives for the prevailing COMESA’s integrating 
framework. 
· The monetary policy convergence criterion has witnessed breaches in the whole years 
of 2012 and 2014. The coordinating efforts for monetary policy will lie on Egypt, 
Sudan, Malawi, and Ethiopia. Furthermore, an efficient reporting scheme about 
inflation rates to the COMESA’s secretariat is crucial.  
· The intra-COMSEA’s trade has represented small percentages as compared to the 
COMESA’s international trade. It has to increase considerably through coordinating 
fiscal policies of member states about tariffs as well as none tariffs barriers.  
· Given the developments in the COMESA’s main macroeconomic indicators, there is a 
deficiency regarding monetary and fiscal policies coordination. 
· Egypt, Libya, and Sudan are supposed to be the main contributors to the divergence in 
monetary policy, real income, and fiscal policy criteria.  
· The burden of coordinating monetary and fiscal policies will lie on Egypt as a major 
economy in the region with the most important diverging macroeconomic indicators. 
· Egypt is responsible for restructuring the public debt and reducing the fiscal deficit. 
Egypt is subordinate to the emerging market economies and the COMESA’s countries 
with respect to debt and fiscal indicators. This situation does not meet the objectives of 
a prominent country like Egypt. 
· In light of the descriptive exploration for Egypt relative to the COMESA, this study 
suggests monitoring the government’s expenditure, determining numerical targets, and 
reallocating it to build-up productive capacities and investments.  
· This policy recommendation for Egypt is consistent with (Cordes et al., 2015) who 
support the application of expenditure rules as tools for enhanced fiscal sustainability. 
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· The analysis of fiscal policy in the COMESA raises the issues of policy commitment 
and accountability. In this context, this paper recommends the following; 
(i)         The establishment of a supranational coordinating body for fiscal policies 
within 3 to 5 years as a time frame. 
(ii) Each member state has to report to this body; (1) the type of fiscal rule that it 
plans to commit its fiscal policy to; (2) the numerical targets of the domestic fiscal 
policy; (3) the country’s current indicators compared to the COMESA’s Treaty 
convergence criteria; (4) the year of implementation; and finally (5) the tools of 
enforcement. 
(iii) The COMESA’s data portal will be required to provide comparable fiscal 
policy indicators within 3 to 5 years. This will enable the coordinating body of 
fiscal policies in monitoring the soundness of fiscal policy in the region’s member 
states. 
· Yes, fiscal policy rules do really matter. 
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